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Mother Nature’s Tolerant Ways: 
Why non-genetic inheritance has nothing to do with evolution 
Abstract 
Recently a number of theorists have suggested that evolution can use non-genetic or environmental 
inheritance to pass on adaptations (e.g. Mameli, 2004).  Furthermore, it has been suggested that non-
genetic, or environmental factors, can play a central role in the process of evolution that is not captured 
by the neo-Darwinian view which places natural selection centre-stage (e.g. Odling-Smee, Laland & 
Feldman, 2003). In this paper we present and clarify neo-Darwinian theory and then take issue with the 
notions of contemporary gene-centred selection and inheritance that non-genetic inheritance theorists 
have used.  We claim that they have misunderstood the distinction and relationship between intrinsic 
and extrinsic inheritance and we clarify this with a number of examples from the behavioural and 
biological sciences. According to this analysis there is no such thing as biologically independent non-
genetic inheritance, all extrinsic inheritance is a consequence of traits and dispositions that are intrinsic 
to an organism and intrinsic design can only be explained through neo-Darwinism.  We point to the 
implications this view has for current conceptions of cultural evolution. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently a number of theorists have argued that the received view of biological evolution is wrong.  
Their arguments focus around the nature and role of the gene as a unit of selection, a unit of instruction 
and a unit of inheritance.  All of these arguments seek to distance themselves from a gene-centred view 
of evolution and to augment neo-Darwinian theory with other processes and mechanisms that can 
account for design. 
The purpose of this paper is to clarify neo-Darwinian theory and in so doing show behavioural 
scientists the scope of neo-Darwinism.  We believe that recent arguments relying on non-genetic 
inheritance have significantly underestimated the explanatory resources of neo-Darwinism.  We begin 
with a detailed statement of the received view, framed within a discussion of intrinsic design and using 
examples from cognitive psychology (sections 2 and 3).  We then use this statement as a tool to unpick 
various assumptions and errors in three forms of the contra-orthodoxy argument – the argument from 
development, the argument from environmental change, and the argument from extrinsic inheritance.  
This last argument receives a great deal of attention in order to firmly establish the framework we 
begin the paper with.  
 
2. The Relationship between Design and the Environment 
Imagine that you are to build a robot that has the one function of travelling across a room.  A simple 
solution would be to build a machine with wheels powered by a motor.  The machine should readily 
travel across the floor toward the opposite side of the room, where it will hit a wall and stop. 
This machine is not terribly sophisticated as it has no internal control over its movement; its 
wheels simply keep going until power is lost or an obstacle is met.  A more advanced machine would 
move around obstacles, and turn away from a wall when it meets one.  This would require lateral 
sensors, such that left-side sensors would switch right-side wheels off, and vice versa.  With such 
sensors and wiring the robot could take input from a world of solid objects and, for the most part, move 
away from them. However, meeting an object head-on would stop the robot so that the intervention of 
an engineer would be necessary for continued movement. 
To solve the problem of head-on encounters more architectural features are required.  Such 
features will add new circuits to the motor control system, perhaps allowing reverse movement for a 
limited period, perhaps something more complicated.  Whatever additions, the aim would be to use the 
input from head-on encounters to prompt a new behaviour, which in turn would render the robot more 
independent from the interventions of engineers. 
From this we can draw an important lesson.  The particular environment encountered is only 
navigable by our robots if they are designed in a particular way. More precisely, the robots must be 
prepared for the inputs they receive for these inputs to bring about the functional outcome: the robot’s 
movement across the room.  The second robot was not prepared to use the input from its sensors when 
it encountered an object head-on.  As we suggested, the only way to make this input informative was to 
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change the internal architecture of the robot, and this would prepare the system for such inputs in the 
future.  However, the second robot was prepared to use individual inputs from its left and right sensors 
(when these did not co-occur), and this made these input patterns informative. 
The sensory input devices of this robot would also have to be specialised, only taking a certain 
sort of input from the world.  For example, paddles might be used.  When a paddle comes into contact 
with an object it is depressed and this sends a signal to the appropriate set of wheels instructing them to 
stop.  We can refer to such sensory input devices as domain-specific.  For the second robot, the 
domain-specific inputs that it could use towards fulfilling its function defined its environment.  This 
robot only knew the world through a subset of such inputs; those that its internal architecture prepared 
it to accept.  We could define this subset of inputs as the robot’s ecology.  That the robot can use this 
specific ecology is a consequence of its design. Or, to put this point another way, the robot’s design 
defines a potential ecology and a match of the encountered ecology to this potential ecology is 
necessary for the robot to fulfil its function.  
Organic life appears designed just as the robots are.  This is because organic life appears to 
produce purposeful functions under certain conditions.  Organisms take different inputs from different 
aspects of the environment and these inputs change various aspects of those organisms.  For example, 
humans (among many other species) take air into lungs.  The oxygen in the air is absorbed and 
oxygenates red blood cells as they flow through the lungs.  The oxygen is then transported around the 
body by the red blood cells and is used up at different sites of metabolic action in the rest of the body.  
Deoxygenated blood eventually returns, through the circulation of the vascular system, to the lungs 
where it is re-oxygenated and the cycle continues.  Oxygen is crucial in maintaining all of the body’s 
many processes.  Other, inert gases can be inputted but they have no such effect.  Such gases can 
displace oxygen or reduce the level of oxygen saturation in the gases entering the lungs and thereby 
cause the system to fall into disarray, but note that this is not a systematic effect, but rather a 
systemically catastrophic one.  The pulmonary system is prepared for the input of oxygen, and only 
oxygen. 
Robots and organisms, by dint of their internal design, are able to utilize specific inputs.  In 
the case of robots the design results from decisions made by engineers.  In the case of organisms the 
design results from the operation of natural selection, the blind algorithmic process that Darwin first 
described in 1859. 
Organisms are more complicated than robots, but not simply because they exhibit many more 
features (which is currently true) but because they also inherit their design features.  Genes are the units 
of this inheritance.  Although genes do not directly produce all the features of an organism, they either 
direct the assembly of amino acids into polypeptides or they control the production of polypeptides and 
other bio-molecules indirectly as part of an organised decoding system. Polypeptides fold into mature 
proteins which in turn are organised to form all of the various systems that constitute an organism. Not 
all of these processes are understood yet, but the central role for DNA has been well established ever 
since classic experiments involving the phenomena of bacterial transformation (Avery, MacLeod & 
McCarty, 1944) and bacteriophage replication (Hershey & Chase, 1952) confirmed that DNA was the 
genetic material. 
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Modern evolutionary theory sees genes as the fundamental level of analysis (Dawkins, 1976) 
because genes are ultimately affected by the success of the traits they build.  A trait that is selected 
against is a trait that fails to use inputs from the environment in such a way as to further the survival 
and, crucially, reproductive success of the organism bearing it.  The genes for this trait will not make it 
into the next generation, and the source of this intrinsic design feature will be lost. 
Genes are also the principal source of new intrinsic design in organisms, having the same 
functional role as the engineers who alter the design of robots in order to meet challenges from the 
environment.  But this role is fulfilled with rather greater conservatism in that alterations are made in 
series to a lineage of organisms and with a higher probability, after selection, associated with 
alterations of small effect. Gene mutations can effect change in two main ways: 1. by altering gene 
expression levels or 2. by altering gene sequence and hence function (for a recent discussion of 
adaptive genetic change see Nachman, 2005).  Individual mutations may be harmful, but the 
accumulation of favourable mutations ultimately produces new phenotypic features.    It is through 
these means that novel design is added to a species and it is through this method that changes in 
environments can be countered such that organisms are newly equipped to process novel inputs 
meaningfully. 
Unlike designing robots there is no pre-specified set of functions that an organism must have.  
What counts most simply for an organism is its ability to reproduce and pass its design features, its 
traits, onto the next generation.  Organisms inherit design from their previous generations and this 
design allows them to process inputs that they are prepared for.  Environmental change, which is often 
detrimental to survival, is countered by beneficial mutations (or shuffling of existing mutations through 
recombination). Such mutations are beneficial because they increase the probability of survival or the 
fecundity of organisms relative to conspecifics. So natural selection is the consequence of intrinsic 
design features meshing more or less well with an environment, and, for each step in this process, this 
is ultimately a chance occurrence.  Only those designs that allow an organism to survive and reproduce 
in an environment will be selected.  This means that only those intrinsic features of an organism that in 
some way represent the external world and deliver a useful response will be selected for and can be 
considered adaptations. 
 
3. Day-to-Day Changes and Cognition 
In our description of natural selection we discussed environmental change and the requirement to alter 
intrinsic design.  We used the robot examples to demonstrate that certain environmental problems 
require new phenotypic features to solve them and that this means new intrinsic architecture.  However, 
we are aware that many aspects of the day-to-day environment change and that organisms seem able to 
deal with this.  This is not a challenge to the view we espouse. 
Very simple organisms, like our simple robots, can deal with change just so long as that 
change is represented in their intrinsic design.  So, only some change is relevant to such organisms, 
while other changes can go unnoticed.  For example, our second robot had lateral sensors to detect 
objects and we showed how these sensors could control movement in an appropriate way.  The design 
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represents a certain form of possible environmental change.  If there is an object on the left of the 
robot, it will be able to move right to avoid it.  The robot might exist in a room of fixed obstacles for a 
period of time, but if it were moved to a new room with new obstacles the same conditional 
architecture would allow it to navigate and deal with such change.  Equally, if a new obstacle were to 
be placed in the robot’s usual room it could cope.  If this obstacle was another robot that could move 
around, the robot could still move away from it. 
Evolutionary psychology analyses behaviour in terms of possible adapted functionality and 
through such functional decompositions begins to describe the kinds of computations that a brain must 
run in order to deliver behaviour.  These computations, as with our robots’, can be understood as 
conditional reasoning mechanisms that take some input p, and produce some output q such that p→q.  
Under this description, p represents a class of inputs that arise within a specific adaptive problem 
domain.  The computational mechanism that accepts p and produces the appropriate q, which 
represents a class of adaptive behavioural responses to p, can be thought of as a module (see Samuels, 
1998, for a discussion).  This module will contain some content, in the form of a statistical composite 
of representations of p, such that there is a ‘concept’ of p, and some specific operations for delivering 
q.  Note that under this description, no such thing as a domain-general problem-solving device could 
exist for there is no such thing as a domain-general problem that could lead to the selection of a 
particular p→q device (for a discussion of degrees of domain generality see Atkinson and Wheeler, 
2004).   Adaptive problems are about very specific things such as food acquisition, mating interactions, 
social exchange, etc.  What is more, we know from work in artificial intelligence that robots with 
domain-general mechanisms find complex problem spaces, of the sort faced by most organisms, 
computationally intractable.  Only when the computational architecture is divided into domain-specific 
frames, that contain appropriate content and computational processes, do robots succeed in complex 
spaces (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Fodor, 2000). 
Cosmides (1989) has provided the now classic empirical example of this approach with her 
work on social reasoning.  Cosmides took an extant conditional reasoning paradigm, the Wason 
Selection Task, which typically produced incorrect responses across a wide variety of participants 
when presented in an abstract form.  Overall in this form fewer than 25% of participants reason 
correctly, and typically it is lower than this with around 9% of the participants succeeding.   Cosmides 
argued that, given the overwhelming evidence in support of a social origin for much cognition, people 
might be expected to conditionally reason better when the task is set in a social domain.  More 
specifically, given that social species need to be wary of cheats, people should reason very well about 
social contract violations even if they follow the same conditional formalism as the abstract task.  This 
is indeed what Cosmides found and she produced a huge facilitation effect by packaging the same 
logical problem in a social contract scenario.  This effect has proved to be cross-culturally robust 
(Sugiyama, Tooby & Cosmides, 2002) and has neurological evidence to support the proposed cognitive 
architecture (Stone, Cosmides, Tooby, Kroll & Knight, 2002).  Cosmides has clearly provided strong 
evidence for domain-specific reasoning abilities with her experiments (but see Fodor 2000 for an 
argument about the possible conflation of the kinds of logic invoked in Cosmides’s tasks; also Dickins 
2003). 
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What evolutionary psychology provides is an account of behaviour in terms of internal 
computational processes that rely in part on stored content.  This stored content allows the recognition 
of input as well as the ‘tripping’ of appropriate processes that will deliver an output.  Traditional 
cognitive models have had great difficulty in understanding the nature of content, as well as the source 
of its veridical nature.  Natural selection clearly accounts for its veridical nature (see Millikan, 1993, 
for a related discussion).  However, it is clear that for such cognition to work well the organism must 
find itself within an appropriate environment, where it can receive appropriate inputs and where its 
outputs make sense. 
The evolutionary psychology account extends to learning mechanisms too.  Learning 
mechanisms are sensitive to specific domains (Gallistel, 1999).  What is more, to make learning useful 
it must be constrained.  If learning were the outcome of a general associative mechanism, that 
associated everything with everything, we would know nothing of the world.  Instead, we need to 
selectively associate certain things, things that are important.  For example, associating smoke with fire 
is useful, and so perhaps some order of Humean contingent and temporal regularity rule might be 
helpful in facilitating such knowledge acquisition, as well as a disposition to attend to certain salient 
features of the world.  The Garcia Effect, which shows that rats will associate taste with nausea but not 
with unpleasant visual or auditory stimuli, was a conclusive early demonstration of this fact (Garcia & 
Koelling, 1966), and is further supported by the need to introduce a contingent and salient stimulus in 
order to train new associations.  Without reward or punishment learning cannot be achieved; one 
requires something to tie the learning to adapted dispositions. 
Day-to-day changes in the environment can be dealt with by an organism that is sufficiently 
prepared to deal with the relevant inputs.  This is not an infinite capacity, for it is one that has been 
designed by natural selection.  Evolved cognition, then, can be seen as a set of calibration devices that 
help to fit an organism to its not-quite static environment.  This does not mean that natural selection 
had great foresight in predicting future change, but, on the contrary, that some change, at the day-to-
day scale, is reliable. 
 
4. Arguments against Orthodoxy 
What we have discussed so far represents the orthodox view of evolution.  However, some theorists 
complain that this gene-centred view operates on the premise that genes are precise blueprints for an 
organism, and in so doing it fails to encapsulate the dynamic interaction with the environment that 
occurs during development.  Apparently: 
 
This premise is based on the underlying assumptions that phylogenetic information is somehow encoded in the 
genes and that in the course of development this information unfolds by way of (a) predetermined maturation or 
(b) activation by some (usually unspecified) environmental input…  This explicitly preformationist view 
virtually ignores the role of developmental processes in the realization of phenotypic characters or traits.  It 
assumes that development is internally determined, set on course at conception and specified by genetic 
programs designed and selected over evolutionary time.  (Lickliter and Honeycutt, 2002: 821) 
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Lickliter and Honeycutt continue their paper with an argument defending a role for extrinsic factors in 
evolution.  They note that gene expression can be switched on or off by a number of internal and 
external signals “including such non obvious factors as the light-dark cycle… and tactile stimulation” 
(p. 823) and they discuss how movement is essential for bone development in birds during their chick 
phase. 
Arguments of this sort amount to nothing more than arguments by suggestion.  In Lickliter 
and Honeycutt’s case the suggestion is that the orthodox view has adopted some sort of essentialism 
and believes genes to contain the instructions and resources for building an entire organism.  However, 
the evidence they present is fully in line with an orthodox and non-essentialist explanation, for Lickliter 
and Honeycutt’s entire argument rests on a misinterpretation of evolved design. 
As discussed, natural selection creates design.  This design is an intrinsic property of an 
organism and extrinsic features only make sense in terms of this intrinsic design.  Gene mutations have 
regular effects on phenotypic design.  Given this there is no need to claim that genes are the sole 
authors of that design, just that they are essential and intrinsic.  It is well known, for example, that Hox 
genes (the evolutionarily massively conserved genes involved in the basic body plan) are controlled by 
species-specific genes, as well as chemical gradients in order to give distinct body shape.  What is 
more, these genes compete for resources to build various aspects of the body and will greedily take 
over resources if other Hox genes are knocked out, or chemical gradients altered, leading to major 
dysmorphia and usually death (see Deacon, 1997, for a discussion).  What is asserted, purely as a 
logical consequence of what evolution does, is that for nutritional inputs and for signals from other 
developing systems etc. to have a systemic effect there must be preparedness for the input.  Genes are 
not only intrinsic features but they are also inherited, and they are consistently brought to each 
developmental situation, and therefore consistently set the agenda for other inputs.  But this must not be 
seen as a compromise.  Theorists, such as Lickliter and Honeycutt, have not only failed to understand 
the orthodoxy, but they have also failed to grasp how an understanding of the intrinsic design features 
of an organism help us to understand the nature and role of extrinsic environmental features.  The role 
of chemical gradients, light dark cycles and tactile stimulation only make sense in light of intrinsic 
design and intrinsic inheritance. 
Lickliter and Honeycutt represent one unorthodox error.  There are others.  Recently some 
theorists have begun to worry about the extrinsic features of organic life in relation not to ontogenetic 
processes but to evolutionary processes themselves.  Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman (2003), for 
example, have discussed in detail the phenomenon of niche construction.  This is where the actions of 
an organism change the ecology in which they live to such an extent that it has an effect upon the 
phenotypic features of that organism. 
One example is that of the earthworm.  The action of burrowing has altered the consistency, as 
well as the chemical composition, of the soil in which this species lives.  This has led to an increase in 
the number of plants that grow in the soil, which in turn provides earthworms with more to consume, 
thus improving their nutritional lot.  It has also made the task of moving through the soil less onerous 
than that originally confronted by earthworm ancestors, for the soil has become more broken up.  As a 
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consequence of this earthworm epidermal and mucus secretion structure has changed over a number of 
generations. 
It is important to be clear about what is happening in the above example, and more generally 
within niche construction, as well as what is not happening.  From the perspective outlined in this 
paper, earthworms had certain heritable intrinsic features that allowed them to act in certain ways that 
were adapted in past environments.  However, these very actions altered the environment in which they 
lived to such an extent that new selection pressures were brought to bear upon earthworms.  
Fortunately, earthworms presented sufficient variation or an appropriate mutational change in their 
intrinsic structure, to adapt to the new environment.  What is more, these intrinsic features, as for 
previous traits, were heritable.  In short, niche construction refers to effects that organisms can have 
upon the selection pressures that confront them.  What is not happening is a new evolutionary process 
whereby novel inputs are themselves rewiring the intrinsic features of the organism, which is in fact 
what Odling-Smee et al. claim, for they see niche construction as a neglected process in evolution, 
running alongside natural selection.  This claim amounts to a Lamarckian position, which is 
biologically implausible.  All that Odling-Smee et al. point to can be explained by natural selection (see 
Dickins, 2005, for a more detailed discussion of Odling-Smee et al.). 
Odling-Smee et al. are not the only theorists discussing a role for extrinsic features in 
evolution.  A clearly related discussion is being had by some anthropologists and psychologists about 
the role of human cultural behaviour in the evolution of humans, and more specifically about the role of 
memes, a notion first put forward by Dawkins (1976).  Memes defy precise definition (see Aunger, 
2000 for much discussion), but as a broad characterisation they are ideas that are transmitted vertically, 
horizontally and obliquely and that can be seen as the cultural equivalent of genes.  In other words, 
memes are inherited and selected and, as core components of culture, they have a potentially huge 
effect upon humans.  Cultural practices, for example, could be transmitted that have effects upon the 
phenotype of those involved, and, over time, this inheritance allows the new phenotype to increase in 
relative frequency.  However, such a situation could only arise in one of two ways: 
First, cultural effects could be seen as a form of a niche construction where cultural 
behaviours alter the intrinsic design of, for example, humans.  But, as we argued above, such effects 
can only be regarded as a case of natural selection, where organismic action has altered the selection 
pressures confronting that organism or set of organisms.  They cannot be understood in terms of 
cultural inputs directly altering the design of the recipient, without imputing magical and essential 
properties to those inputs.  What is more, the original outputs are the consequence of the intrinsic 
design of the organism.  Given this the second and more moderate way for cultural practices to affect 
phenotypes is to see culture (or memes) as predicated upon extant intrinsic design.1  
A consequence of the position we have outlined is that cultures cannot truly evolve, in the full 
biological sense, for they have no independent existence outside of the biologically based behaviours 
that produce them.  As such, any evolutionary story to be told about culture will be a story about the 
evolution of cultural agents, or more specifically, about the evolution of their cognition.  Memes, then, 
amount to nothing more than a cognitive output, the consequence of a designed system that processes 
certain inputs in specific ways.  That humans can use such outputs as inputs again does not undermine 
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this point.  Under this conception memes have no existence independent of evolved human minds and 
this leads us to question the explanatory value of this theoretical concept.  Interestingly, Dawkins 
(1991) made a related point about memes when he described them as viruses of the mind, thus 
conveying the idea that memes fit the system they infect and act informationally.  According to 
Dawkins our cognition has evolved in such a way as to leave us vulnerable to memes that can cause us 
to act in potentially irrational ways.2 
 
5. The Case For and Against Non-genetic Inheritance 
Mameli (2004) has recently contributed a detailed discussion of extrinsic factors and evolutionary 
process, and it is his argument that shall form the core discussion point for the rest of this paper.  
Whereas previous criticisms of orthodoxy have looked for a role for factors other than genes, or 
processes other than natural selection, Mameli has focused upon other forms of inheritance. 
Mameli states that the received view within evolutionary biology, that only genes are inherited 
and that only genetically caused phenotypic variation is selected, is wrong.  In his paper he claims that 
there are other forms of inheritance too, and he argues for ‘intergenerationally stable phenotypic 
differences due to environmental differences’ (p. 35).  Moreover, his argument posits no intrinsic 
change at all. 
According to Mameli (2004), inheritance is about the preservation of similarity.  Inheritance 
mechanisms, therefore, “are all those mechanisms that cause organisms to resemble their parents in 
phenotypic and/or genetic and/or environmental traits” (p.51).  This is immediately problematic, 
because the orthodox, gene-centred view describes inheritance in terms of relative gene frequencies and 
these are affected by phenotype-environment interactions.  Similarity does not enter into the definition 
but more critically, those genes that code for beneficial traits are passed on, and evince some order of 
similarity, but those that are deleterious are not.  In other words, the similarity noted in offspring is 
permitted by natural selection.  Similarity is a by-product and not where the real action is.  Despite this 
fundamental difference let us continue with his thesis: 
Mameli sees the three types of inheritance – phenotypic, genetic and environmental – as 
theoretically separable and each with their own real effects in the natural world.  To this end he offers 
the thought experiment of the lucky butterfly. 
The lucky butterfly belongs to a species of butterfly that has genetically identical individuals: 
a species that suffers no genetic variation (often referred to as a clone).  The genes of this species build 
bodies in the same way as genes do in all other species; but any variation in those bodies is brought 
about by variation in environmental inputs.  This species of butterfly, when in caterpillar form, is raised 
on the leaves of a particular species of plant – let us call this Plant Species 1 (PS1).  During this phase 
the caterpillar imprints on the taste of the leaves and this enables it, when an adult butterfly, to locate 
more PS1 leaves on which to lay its own eggs.  In this way the caterpillars grow in the same 
environment. 
The lucky butterfly suffers a malfunction in its imprinting mechanism such that it accidentally 
lays its eggs on the leaves of Plant Species 2 (PS2).  However, it just so happens that PS2 provides a 
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better environment than PS1 and the butterflies that emerge from the lucky butterfly’s caterpillars are 
bigger and (in this case) fitter (in a Darwinian sense) than the butterflies arising from a PS1 
environment.  Because these lucky butterfly progeny have an intact imprinting mechanism their 
caterpillars are raised on PS2 leaves and gradually the relative number of lucky butterfly’s descendants 
increases. 
Mameli is at pains to point out that the malfunction in the imprinting mechanism is not a 
genetic malfunction, yet the lucky butterfly’s descendants have benefited from the inheritance of 
similarity – in this case, a similar caterpillar phase environment, that of PS2 leaves.  It is this kind of 
effect that Mameli labels as non-genetic inheritance and selection.  The claim is that thanks to the 
imprinting mechanism the plant species environment is an intergenerationally stable developmental 
factor, of the same order as genes in the received view of evolution, and therefore selection can operate 
to favour this environmentally caused difference within the clone or species.  Intergenerationally stable 
developmental factors are crucial for they can both cause a beneficial trait and allow it to be passed on 
into the next generation and beyond. 
Under the received view selection changes the relevant gene frequencies, but under Mameli’s 
view selection can also alter the frequency of a particular phenotype by changing the frequency of 
intergenerationally stable environmental factors.  The plant species is the intergenerationally stable 
environmental factor for the lucky butterfly’s progeny and this leads to fitness through a bigger size.  
We can refer to bigger size, the product of selection, as an adaptation. 
Once Mameli has presented the theoretical possibility of non-genetic inheritance he then sets 
about discussing examples of it in the natural world.  He is careful to note that the pure-form non-
genetic inheritance of the lucky butterfly example is hypothetical; there is always genetic variance 
underlying phenotypic traits in the real world.  But, this does not preclude the existence of stable 
environmental factors too. 
Mameli lists many examples.  We shall only outline one.  Pacific salmon imprint upon the 
river in which they are born using olfactory cues.  This imprinting allows them to return to their natal 
waterway to breed, and as such this site becomes intergenerationally stable.  There is potential Mameli-
type selection here too, for some waterways are better for breeding and for the subsequent development 
of offspring. 
Given that Mameli has already redefined inheritance in terms of similarity it is not too 
surprising that he can then go onto find specific examples of it in the natural world.  What is more, 
these cited examples, as with all the others, are again a form of argument by suggestion.  We are given 
ample evidence of imprinting mechanisms and relata in the natural world and then nudged into the 
intuition that, because of Mameli’s earlier comments, and because, for example some rivers provide 
better environments for salmon development, the logic of his thesis is correct.  This really only 
amounts to a list of possible premises; the work to connect them in a convincing fashion is left to the 
lucky butterfly thought experiment, and as we shall demonstrate this has serious flaws. 
The imprinting mechanism of the lucky butterfly is a non-genetic inheritance mechanism, 
under Mameli’s scheme, because it produces intergenerational developmental stability.    According to 
Mameli, we can take this argument further.  He notes that humans are born into an environment with 
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stable gravitational qualities that are different from those on other planets.  These stable qualities aid in 
the development of species-specific limbs etc., which is not dissimilar to the ‘evidence’ used by 
Lickliter and Honeycutt to defend their position.  According to Mameli: 
 
It follows that it is partly because both my father and I have been exposed to an acceleration of gravity of 
roughly 9.8m/s2 that we have developed similar (normal) legs and similar (normal) walking skills.  This means 
that the acceleration of gravity is an inherited developmental factor for all humans.  The causal processes 
responsible for the fact that, generation after generation, humans remain exposed to an acceleration of gravity 
of 9.8m/s2 is an inheritance mechanism for humans, even if it is a mechanism that we get ‘for free’, 
independently of any biological process.  (2004:57) 
 
During this paper we have noted a distinction between qualities, or features that are intrinsic and 
extrinsic to an organism.  Following from this, intrinsic inheritance is the inheritance of constitutive 
design features, and extrinsic inheritance is what Mameli seeks to defend.  Extrinsic factors that are of 
relevance to the survival and reproduction of organisms are, like intrinsic features, clearly useful.  But 
for extrinsic factors to be useful to an organism that organism must be designed in such a way as to 
make use of the extrinsically sourced inputs.  In this way, extrinsic features are informative.  Intrinsic 
design features will critically limit what can be processed – it is for this reason that we cannot digest 
granite or see all of the electromagnetic spectrum.  This means that in order to fully appreciate the role 
of what Mameli terms an intergenerationally stable environmental factor we need to understand the 
design features of the organism that is capable of utilising this factor.  Any external input will only 
have utility if the system is prepared for that input.  Such preparedness is the subject matter for 
evolutionary theory, as we have shown. 
The key element in Mameli’s thought experiment is the imprinting mechanism: the design 
feature of Mameli’s lucky butterfly that allows it to use the PS1 and PS2 environments.   The 
imprinting mechanism can use inputs from PS1 and PS2 and this means that the imprinting mechanism 
was prepared for these inputs.3  The imprinting mechanism is clearly an adaptation, in that it affords the 
choice of a stable and useful environment for caterpillars, allowing them to grow and then reproduce 
themselves.  If it is adaptive (even in this loose sense) then there must be an evolutionary story to tell 
about the origin and make-up of the imprinting mechanism.  What is more, this evolutionary story must 
become a story about the selection of relevant genes because we know, from Mameli, that the nervous 
system that produces the imprinting mechanism and behaviour is built from genes.  So, at some point in 
the history of this species there was genetic variation at least in terms of the coding for this aspect of 
butterfly neurology.  At some point in history normal selection pressures have trimmed this genetic 
variation.  
The lucky butterfly thought experiment is now somewhat reduced to a discussion about how a 
given phenotypic trait, imprinting, operates in the world.  This does not exactly undermine Mameli's 
argument but it does change the focus from discussion of non-genetic selection and inheritance to a 
comment that the genes controlling imprinting have produced a mechanism with potentially wide 
targeting - at least as wide as PS1 and PS2.  Furthermore, we should not call the lucky butterfly's 
accident a malfunction, for this butterfly has simply revealed the breadth of functionality for the 
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imprinting mechanism, as afforded by natural selection operating over the relevant genes.  A 
malfunction would see a non-imprinting effect (i.e. no imprinting, or only partial imprinting) or a 
deleterious imprinting, for example, targeting a toxic plant species.  The raw material for evolution by 
genetic selection, mutation, is different in two ways.  First, its effects are intrinsic to the source of 
design (in this case the imprinting mechanism) and, second, at least in interesting cases, it creates new 
potential within it (whereas here we are limited by it). 
Even though we might see non-genetic selection in the real world, i.e. patterns that are 
commensurate with the lucky butterfly thought experiment, it is perhaps best regarded not as true 
selection of features that can be intrinsically inherited, i.e. not as evolution per se, but as what we term 
evolutionary tolerance.4  Phenotypic traits, expressed by genes, can have a breadth of functionality that 
affords a certain amount of slack.  This can lead to a favouring of some aspects of that breadth over 
others.  For example, there are many ways in which humans can walk, as seen in differences in gait.  
Many of these differences are due to other system demands, such as muscular-skeletal composition, 
body weight, sensitivity of proprioception, etc.  Yet other aspects, however, are a consequence of the 
environment and some surfaces afford better locomotion than others.  It is entirely possible that moving 
to a particular terrain will favour some individuals over those that do not move there.  What is 
extremely unlikely is that a very general phenotypic trait would be selected for, such as a general 
locomotion device that would deal equally well with all terrains and would allow individuals to fly, 
walk, run, swim, move up vertical surfaces etc.  This is for well-rehearsed reasons (see above), for 
selection operates on domain-specific problems.  Legs allow running and walking, and can aid in 
swimming and climbing, and that is it.  To change the domain in which an adaptation operated, in 
response to radical changes, would require more fundamental (genetic) rewiring.  (And this, in turn, 
requires sources of genetic variation such as mutation and recombination.)  In short, the domain of the 
adaptive problem sets evolutionary tolerance – sometimes this can be relatively broad and sometimes 
relatively narrow, but it is never infinite.  The lucky butterfly’s imprinting mechanism has a tolerance 
of at least 1 + 1 plant species types, and it is more than likely that there are some specific reasons for 
this having worked out (such as species similarities between PS1 and PS2) that are also a consequence 
of evolution operating over genes.5 
There are some other problems with Mameli’s argument. 
In contemporary neo-Darwinism, an adaptation is a feature that, in a particular environment 
and through its selection over other variants during evolutionary time, has afforded the organism some 
advantage over its competitors lacking this feature.  The importance of the environment is emphasised 
in evolutionary psychology in which mismatches between the environment of evolutionary adaptedness 
and a particular organismic feature are often invoked to explain seemingly maladapted traits.  By 
emphasising the positive possibility that features may be co-opted for or acquire different functions 
Mameli (2004) seems to offer a new path for evolution through environmental change. As we have 
argued, the flexibility displayed by the lucky butterfly and acted on by non-genetic selection in 
Mameli’s example is merely revealed functionality inherent in an imprinting mechanism that has 
undergone previous (genetic) selection.  But what of the specific claim that non-genetic selection has 
produced an adaptation in respect of the lucky butterfly’s (and its descendents’) larger size? 
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While a change has occurred in his example, neither the butterfly nor the butterfly’s 
imprinting mechanism has acquired a new function.  In respect of the butterfly’s larger size, this can be 
seen to be a consequence of the superior growth environment offered by PS2.  And, while some (lucky) 
members of the butterfly clone have found a new growth environment (PS2), this environment must 
share key features in common with the first (PS1) in order for the imprinting mechanism to latch on. 
There is also a more fundamental point.  We have just implied that the butterfly’s larger size 
cannot be an adaptation to the PS2 environment in respect of selection between environments; 
however, it is clearly an adaptive response to this environment.  The difference is that the change to a 
PS2 environment can only cause the butterfly’s size increase because of the butterfly’s inherently 
adaptive response.  And since this relies on an intrinsic property of the butterfly, it must depend on 
intrinsic inheritance and selection. 
Any adaptation is an adaptation to a particular environment.  So, as we have argued above we 
can say that a change in the environment sets the problem in evolution rather than providing the 
solution.  This idea dovetails with the notion of limited evolutionary tolerance.  The account of the 
lucky butterfly now fits squarely into an unreconstructed neo-Darwinism in which the environment, 
and variation in it, is clearly recognised as the driver for evolutionary change, change that requires 
intrinsic (genetic) variation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of the current paper has been to show that all attempts to argue against the orthodox view, 
that evolution is a process of selection for intrinsic design that relies upon an intrinsic (genetic) 
inheritance system, have failed.  They have failed because they have misunderstood the core notion of 
natural selection and design.  In order to make this argument we have focused upon many aspects of 
behavioural design, from a conceptual discussion about robot architectures, through an analysis of 
some key work in evolutionary cognitive psychology and finally to a discussion of how extragenetic 
inheritance has been conflated with imprinting and learning.  Our ambition has been to show how 
natural selection can build calibrating organisms that have intrinsic design features that capture day-to-
day changes.  The ability to deal with such changes is often dealt with by learning theories and we hope 
to have provided an evolutionary perspective on what that means. 
We conclude, more radically, that the claims made for non-genetic selection in general fit into 
a larger intellectual trend whereby cultural processes are given explanatory primacy over biological 
phenomena.  What the reasons for this are remain obscure, but these positions reflect an ignorance of 
the philosophical underpinnings of evolutionary theory itself.  Like all scientific theories, evolutionary 
theory adopts a form of naturalism and rejects essentialism.  The alternative theories discussed in this 
paper fail to meet this criterion. 
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1 But note that this does not then rule out subsequent feedback effects, whereby organismic action 
causes new selection pressures to emerge. 
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2 Dawkins refers to various religious ideas as well as those associated with cults etc.  He also 
interestingly hypothesises an increased vulnerability to infection during the early stages of 
development, as well as an element of path dependent infection, such that some memetic viruses make 
it more likely that later ones will thrive. 
 
3 If the imprinting mechanism was not prepared for such inputs (in the sense of ‘prepared’ already 
introduced) then how are we to account for its ability to deal with either PS1 or PS2?  There are only 
two possible alternatives: (1) that the imprinting mechanism is in fact a domain-general learning 
mechanism or (2) that the inputs from PS1 and PS2 somehow carry content that redesigns the intrinsic 
features of the butterflies.  We have discussed reasons for rejecting (1) earlier in the paper.  If we were 
to explore (2) it will either reduce to a state change argument, and therefore it will not amount to a 
suggestion of systemic rewiring, or it will violate the principles of evolutionary theory by adopting a 
form of essentialism. 
 
4 Dawkins’ discussion of our vulnerability to particular memes might be reconstrued in light of the 
concept of evolutionary tolerance and seen as a cost of evolved cognitive tolerance. 
 
5 It is possible that evolution in PS2 may form part of a more complex account of why the lucky 
butterfly was lucky, but this does not negate the point made here. 
 
